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1. Introduction 
The role of women in nation building cannot be underestimated. An empowered woman can contribute in 
society in many ways. Women’s greater evenhandedness in her own decision making is considered as 
desirable (United Nations, 1995). Thus, the concept of women empowerment contains their decision 
making choices and context in which these decisions can be exercised. The instrumental values of women 
empowerment include their decision making in all other spheres especially in child welfare (Hoddinott & 
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Haddad, 1995; Thomas, 1990, 1997; Kabeer, 2011).  
The social security interventions aim to safeguard vulnerable segments of society through various 
channels in order to counterbalance the  substantial decline in income from work that results from 
sickness, natural disasters/threats, unemployment, invalidity, death of main earners, old age and 
employment injury etc. (Shepherd et al., 2004; World Bank, 2018). Safety nets used as a pragmatic 
mechanism to reduce poverty, to improve socio-economic wellbeing, to protect poor from uncertain risks 
and shocks and to enhance livelihood of the destitute. The last decade has witnessed an inspiring growth 
in various kinds of cash transfers programmes in terms of numbers and volume in the developing world. 
A rigorous analysis from various studies shows that cash transfers have had positive and significant 
impact on consumption, educational attainment, health, poverty, socio-economic wellbeing and women 
empowerment (Baired  et al. , 2013; De Braeuw , 2014;  Haushofer & Shapiro, 2016; Ambler, 2016).  
  
The role of social schemes is very important in enhancing women empowerment as these schemes often 
designed to target female-headed households and transfer cash to women. The potential of prevailing 
social schemes is highly considerable in improving women empowerment in asset accumulation, 
participation status, negotiation and control over those institutions that may affect their lives (FAO, 2015). 
A set of social protection policies and programmes that target only women to improve their skills may 
increase access to resources, heighten their participation in labor market and increase women mobility 
which not only lead to improve their economic empowerment but also effectively reduce poverty and 
vulnerabilities among poor segments (Holmes &Jones, 2013; Sabates-Wheeler & Devereux, 2007). 
 
Literature about safety nets impact on women empowerment shows mixed evidence of impact on variety 
of indicators pertinent to women empowerment. Some studies show little evidence of impact on women 
empowerment (Attanasio & Lechene, 2002; Handa et al., 2009), whereas some observed positive impact 
(Adato et al., 2000; Haushofer & Shapiro, 2016). Many studies conducted by researchers to dig out its 
impact on variety of indicators but within limited scope by using either cross-sectional data or primary 
data of one or few districts.  The study of Shahzad (2011) has computed impact of BISP cash assistance 
on women empowerment by using primary data in selected villages of Punjab and Sindh whereas, the 
study of Nayab & Farooq (2014) estimated BISP impact on welfare indicators by using HIES data for 
2010,  OPM measured impact on various indicators such as livelihood strategies, poverty, asset 
accumulations, women empowerment, poverty, child schooling and child nutrition three consecutive 
rounds  2013, 2014 and 2016  by using cross sectional analysis Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) 
model. Ambler & De Brauw (2017) computed impact of BISP on selected indicators of women 
empowerment by using 2013 rounds data and by employing RDD model.  
 
BISP is a flagship programme of Government of Pakistan that was emerged in 2008 to protect the poor 
from high food inflation and to increase the declining purchasing power of the defenseless. The long term 
objective of the BISP is to meet SDGs to eradicate poverty and empower women (GoP, 2018). Currently 
the programme offers cash assistance to 5.8 million ever-married women with a quarterly stipend of PKR 
5500 (around US$ 35). Besides, under conditional cash transfers, the programme aims to assist the 
children of poor families to complete their primary level education, around 3.4 million children are 
enrolled and their mothers were given additional top-up of PKR 750 per quarter with the condition that 
child will attend school and meet minimum attendance of 70 percent (GoP, 2018). 
 
The present study is carried out to check whether the BISP’s UCT payments have a positive impact on 
women empowerment or not? The analysis is carried out by using set of various indicators pertinent to 
gender norms from men and women perspectives, women autonomy/mobility and women socio-economic 
and political empowerment. Since programm’s inception, the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries have 
been targeted through Proxy Means Test (PMT) that is poverty score determined the eligibility criteria for 
the programme where the households having poverty less than or equal to 16.17 is served as target 
group/beneficiary households whilst the households having poverty score 16.18 to 21.17 is declared as 
non-beneficiary households.  
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This study is a contribution to existing literature in many ways as in South Asian countries, specifically in 
Pakistan where women mobility/ autonomy and decision making power are very much low (Jeejebhoy & 
Sathar, 2001). Second, the BISP cash transfer programme is specifically designed to empower poor ever 
married women of Pakistan since 2011 to meet SDGs. Third, the programme is largest and unconditional 
in nature similar to other programmes implemented in Sub-saharan Africa, (Bonilla et al; 2016) that 
expand quickly over time.  Fourth, the study has used robust impact evaluation techniques to estimate the 
impact as previous studies were qualitative in nature and lacks robust impact evaluation technique 
specifically longitudinal survey. The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes 
international and national viewpoint of various studies related to impacts of safety nets on women 
empowerment. Section 3 explains data description, methodology employed while Section 4 encompasses 
empirical findings of the study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The SSNs are broadly perceived as protective mechanism to help destitute and underprivileged and to 
augment inclusive growth (Barrientos & Hulme, 2008). Besides, safety nets used as pragmatic mechanism 
that served as ladder for the poor to graduate them out of poverty trap and protect from socio-economic 
instabilities. Various studies are carried out to dig out welfare impact of safety nets, however, this study is 
exclusively carried out to dig out the welfare impact of BISP programme on women empowerment by 
using BISP Impact Evaluation Survey dataset from 2011-2019 rounds. This section contains national and 
international studies assessment pertinent to safety nets impact on welfare indicators of women 
empowerment. 
 
2.1 Does Cash Assistance Empower Women? Review Perspective 
The notion to empower women through providing unconditional cash transfers to women is the key 
objective of the BISP cash assistance programme.  The idea to empower women was first derived through 
original plan of Progresa/Oportunidades that was designed to empower women through increasing her 
income that ultimately improve her agency within households (Schultz, 2004, Ambler & De Brauw, 
2017). The evidences of international and national studies are mixed pertinent to assessment of safety nets 
on women welfare, empowerment and decision making (De la O Campos, 2015). By looking into relative 
effectiveness of the cash transfer Yoong, Rabinovich and Diepenveen (2012) suggests that bargaining 
power of the women within households depends on social prevailing norms, share of income and her 
formal legal rights. Hence lack of all these can reduce impact of safety nets on improving her bargaining 
power ability within households. Handa (2009) explained that cash transfer grant can crowd out any kind 
of intra-households transfer from men to women instead of improving women bargaining power ability 
within households. The argument of Handa, (2009) is consistent with the substantiation of Progresa 
impact evaluation that conferred that cash transfers led to improve women control over cash assistance 
but little else within households (Attanasio & Lechene, 2002). The arguments of Adato et al, (2000) on 
Progresa Programme is contrary to Attanasio & Lechene, (2002) and Handa (2009) that depict positive 
impact of the programme on self-esteem and self-confidence on women. Jejeebhoy & Sathar, (2001) in 
their study demonstrated that women residing in Punjab province of Pakistan are not permitted to move 
freely than those residing in Uttar Pardesh in India whereas Lodhi (1996) explored that women have no 
rights to move freely outside of their habitants.  
 
Evaluation of safety nets in other countries also found positive and significant impact of safety nets on 
women empowerment such as De Brauw et al. (2014) found positive and significant impact of Bosla 
Familia programme in Brazil whereas, Ambler (2016) found that old age pensions programmes in South 
Africa and extended allowances rights programme in Brazil produce favorable impacts on the education 
level and health status of the children of beneficiary women (Duflo, 2003; Rangel, 2006). Natali et al; 
(2016) estimated the impact of Zambia’s unconditional cash transfer Child Grant programme (CGP) that 
targeted to poor women having young children on savings and women’s participation in non-farm 
enterprises. The results indicate that the CGP led to improve savings of the beneficiary women who hold 
less decision making power at the baseline. Handa et al (2015) also inferred the impact of CGP on 
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maternal health in Zambia by employing randomized design approach and DiD multivariate regression. 
The result indicates that the women beneficiaries of the programme have access to better maternal health 
facilities.  
 
In addition, several evidences showed that programmes specifically targeted to women improve women 
and their children’s clothing (Lundberg et al., 1997). The saving products initiated for women in 
Philippines improved women decision making powers (Kaarlan et al., 2007). The micro credit 
programmes proliferates the financial resources power and mobility to various places of female 
beneficiaries in Bangladesh are observed by Pitt et al. (2006). The programme pertinent to education 
designed at community levels exerted positive impact on empowerment outcomes and employment status 
of beneficiary women (Kandpal, 2013) whilst interventions combined with provision of vocational 
training and awareness about health and risky behaviors reduces sexual activities, pregnancy among 
females aged 14-20 and improved income generating activities in Ugenda (Bandiera, 2012) . The Girl 
Power cash transfer programme in Malawi shows positive and significant role in improving school 
attendance, increase access to financial resources, decline in teen age pregnancies, improvement in health 
facilities and decrease in early age marriages (Baird et al, 2013).  Shahzad (2011) assessed the impact of 
BISP cash assistance programme on women empowerment by using primary data and found that large 
number of beneficiary women residing in interior part of Sindh and Southern Punjab benefiting from the 
programme. Oxford Policy Management (OPM) (2016) assessed impact of BISP programme on variety of 
indicators including women empowerment indicators by employing Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity 
Design Approach (FRDD) on 2016 data set. The study indicated positive and significant impact of the 
programme on women access to cash in emergency, women mobility to various places and child nutrition 
of girls. Ambler & De Brauw, (2017) observed positive and significant impact of BISP cash assistance 
programme of some indicators of women empowerment by using FRDD approach for data set of 2011 
and 2013.  Zuneira (2018) assessed Zakat and BISP impact on women welfare by using HIES data set and 
employing Propensity Score Matching. The study found positive impact of the Zakat programme on 
women welfare whilst observed marginal impact of the BISP programme on women welfare. 
 
2.2 BISP Background and Performance 
The implementation of Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) in 2008 laid the formal foundation of 
social protection in Pakistan with twin goals to eradicate extreme poverty and to empower poor women. 
The BISP cash transfer programmes were effectively targeted poorest through nationwide targeting 
mechanism based on Proxy Means Test (PMT). This mechanism to target beneficiary through PMT was 
developed in 2010 that replaced with criteria of selection of beneficiaries through local parliamentarian to 
selection of beneficiaries through poverty score. The PMT comprises of the poverty score card 
information developed initially from Pakistan Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) Survey 2007-08.  
Afterward, government of Pakistan conducted a poverty score card survey in 2010-11 covered 27 million 
people (87 % coverage of total population) by devising 23 variables in order to calculate poverty score for 
each surveyed household. For selection of desired group of beneficiaries for the programme, the eligibility 
criteria were devised wherein, eligibility threshold of 16.17 were established to provide cash grant to 
households having poverty score 16.17 or less. There could be multiple eligible families within the 
eligible household. Crucially, within each eligible family a receiver woman was identified, defined as 
every ever-married woman having a valid Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) who is then 
eligible to receive the cash benefit. The households having score just above 16.17 or less than 21.17 
declared as control group.   
 
The beneficiaries of BISP were envisaged to provide cash grant on quarterly basis to the eligible women. 
The grant has been gradually increased from PKR 3000/ per family in FY 2008-09 to PKR 3600 during 
FY 2013-14 followed by PKR 4500 in FY 2014-15, PKR 4700 in FY 2015-16 and PKR 5000 in July, 
2019. Despite of change in political regimes, programme expanded overtime with its budgetary allocation 
of PKR 34 billion in 2008 to PKR 180 billion in June, 2019. Currently BISP is making payments to 5.8 
million beneficiaries throughout country, 98.5 percent of them are receiving payment through technology-
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based payment mechanisms i.e. BISP Debit Card (BDC) and Biometric Verification System (BVS). 
Besides UCT, under conditional cash transfers (CCT) so far BISP has enrolled 3.4 million children (aged 
4-12 years) for provision of primary education under Waseela-e-Taleem (WeT) programme.  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Data Description  
This study has used two rounds of BISP impact evaluation survey to measure impact of cash transfers on 
women empowerment. The baseline is carried out in 2011 and follow up round was carried out in 2016. 
Two combinations of dataset have been used for the analysis one is panel household dataset collected for 
evaluation of BISP through 2011-2016 and other is cross-sectional household’s data set for 2016 round.  
Table 1: Province wise Surveyed Households through 2011-2016 
Province Baseline Survey 2016 Round Panel households 
2011-2016 
Punjab 3,162 3,286 932 
Sindh 2,334 3,007 1199 
KP 2,054 2,175 876 
Balochistan 1,125 671 226 
Total 8,675 9,139 3233 
Source: Estimated from the BISP Impact Evaluation Survey 2011- 2016 by authors 
 
3.1.1 Baseline Round 2011 
The baseline round was conducted in 2011 by Oxford Policy Management (OPM) for Impact Evaluation 
Survey of BISP cash transfer. The dataset covers all four provinces of Pakistan and the chosen sample 
households were representative households nearest to the eligibility threshold 16.17. The sample frame 
was constructed as follows: The primary sampling units (PSUs) were randomly selected from the 
sampling frame of PSLM 2007-08 survey stratified at the regional and provincial level. It was pre-
requisite to generate sample that fulfills RDD approach criteria for analysis. However, the poverty score 
card survey was not conducted at the time of baseline survey carried out. For reconstruction of PMT 
required for targeting BISP beneficiaries, listing exercises at households level were made in selected 
PSUs which were encompassing list of variables required for PMT reconstruction. From listed 
households, a pre-determined number of households chosen and PMT was calculated for these selected 
households. On average 100 households PMTs were computed in each PSU. Afterward, the households 
were divided into two groups based on predicted poverty score. The households having poverty score 
equal to 16.17 or less declared as eligible. Whilst the households having poverty score just above than 
16.17 but less than 21.17 declared as non-eligible households. Respective sample from each beneficiary 
and non-beneficiary households were then randomly selected. The baseline survey carried out from 488 
PSUs with average sample per PSU of 19 households in rural cluster and 15 households in urban cluster 
covered 8,675 households nationwide.  
 
3.1.2 Follow-Up Round 2016 
The second follow-up round covers 9,139 UCT households nationwide. In RD estimation, it is best to 
conduct analysis on observations closest to the eligibility threshold. In baseline survey, the PMT was 
reconstructed, the resulting poverty score for large number of observations lies far from the eligibility 
threshold and based on reconstructed PMT that . In 2016 round, for increasing number of observations 
around the eligibility cut-off point, the sample was increased. The 2016 round includes only those 
households that were matched in baseline and with 2013 along with refreshing sample by adding new 
households to increase the number of households around the poverty score eligibility cut-off. As one can 
expect high attrition from 2011 to 2016 due to matching issues as baseline was carried out just right 
before poverty score card survey. Therefore, the baseline households matched with the poverty score card 
with 2016 round were considered as panel households through 2011-2016 and rest households have been 
dropped. The panel data have only 3233 panel households where 2299 are beneficiary households and 934 
are non-beneficiary households from 2011-2016. 
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3.2 Methodology 
To investigate the impact of the BISP unconditional cash assistance on selected indicators pertinent to 
women empowerment, we have employed three stage analysis such as descriptive (bi-variate) as well as 
multi-variate analysis method. In first stage analysis, we have computed summary statistics of socio-
demographic and economic characteristics of the households by segregating beneficiary and non-
beneficiary households based on poverty score lies within +/-5 bandwidth in each round. The 
performances of indicators pertinent to women empowerment have also been assessed by using two 
bandwidth from the eligibility threshold in each round. In multi-variate analysis, we have employed RDD 
approach to infer the impact of the BISP cash programme on selected indicators whereas DiD model used 
to guage the overtime impact of the programme on women empowerment. 
 
3.3 Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) Approach 
The key design of BISP allows us to employ RDD for measuring causal impact of the programme. 
Households having PMT 16.17 or less is served as target group or beneficiary group whereas households 
having PMT just above 16.17 is declared as control group or non-beneficiary households. One of the 
assumption of RDD demonstrate that eligible and non-eligible households nearest to the eligibility 
threshold should only be differ due to BISP designed eligibility criteria. Any other change that occurred 
above and below poverty cut-off should not be changed discontinuously around the eligibility threshold. 
The primary threat to the programme would be observable if some other cash transfer may use the same 
criteria for selection of beneficiaries. But in this case, no other programme is under implementation that 
uses these criteria for selection of beneficiaries.  
 
The RDD approach allows estimating impact of the programme for households located nearest to the 
eligibility threshold. In our case, we are unable to dig out the impact of the programme on all other 
beneficiary households as all eligible households are not BISP beneficiaries and some of non-
beneficiaries lying above the eligibility threshold are BISP beneficiaries. We have employed here, Fuzzy 
RDD to infer the impact as this RDD does not need perfect compliance. The use of bandwidth in RD 
estimation is very much important as the observations located far from the eligibility threshold having 
weak internal validity, less similar with each other which may induce bias whist observations lies nearest 
the eligibility threshold may be smaller in number that may induce variance and limited statistical 
inferences. Here we have used optimal bandwidth for each outcome variable that allows bandwidth to 
vary above and below the cut-off point. We have also estimated RDD impact on outcome variable by 
using fixed bandwidth of +/-5 & +/-3 for each round in 2013, 2016 and 2019 in order to see the impact of 
the programme on outcome variable. Our dataset for 2013 round having panel household whilst 2016 
round analysis is based on cross-sectional households. 
 
3.4 Difference in Difference (DiD) Model 
The study has used the panel household’s data set to gauge the impact of the porogramme over time as 
sufficient time has been passed from 2011 to 2016. Thus one can expect, long run impact of the 
programme on welfare indicators of women empowerment. The analysis is carried on 3364 panel 
households on indicators of gender norms from women and men’s perspective, women mobility to 
various places and women socio-economic and political empowerment. The DiD model is best to 
employee here as the quasi experimental design (QED) requires that the beneficiary and non-beneficiary 
households comparable if they exhibits on average similar characteristics and follow parallel trend 
assumption. In our case, we have constructed panel of those beneficiary and non-beneficiary households 
having on average similar socio-economic and demographic characteristics and rest were dropped (See 
Table 2). Second, the approach combines with intervention and without intervention approach along with 
before and after approach by using baseline (pre-intervention) and follow-up (post intervention) data 
(Khandker et al., 2009).  The DiD model used to assessed the impact of the programme on the outcome 
variable ‘Y’. Employing simple DiD model is misrepresentative  as it does not include time invariant 
characteristics and considered all households in beneficiary and non-beneficiary groups are similar and 
errors of households are more likely to be correlated in pre-treatment and post- treatment. DiD model with 
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fixed effects is more robust and rigorous to use as it clusters errors at household’s level and avoid serial 
correlation.  The following model have been used for employing DiD with fixed effects: 
𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆 =  𝜷𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏 𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 +  𝜷𝟐 𝒃𝒊𝒔𝒑_𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕 +  𝜷𝟑 (𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆 ∗ 𝒃𝒊𝒔𝒑_𝒕𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕) + 𝑭𝑬 +  𝜺 
Where the outcome variables are gender norms, women mobility to various places and socio-economic 
and political empowerment respectively. is CPI, MPI, Headcount poverty and Per adult equivalent 
monthly consumption expenditures respectively, β0 is the constant term, bisp_treat is a dummy variable, 
‘0’ is the indicator for the non-beneficiary group and ‘1’ indicates the beneficiary group. Time is also a 
dummy variable with 0 if the time is 2011 and 1 if the time is 2016; time*bisp_treat is the interaction 
term, the product of time and bisp_treat; FE is each household’s fixed effect and ε is error term. Here β3 
is the coefficient of the DiD. The negative value of β3 depicts the negative impact of the BISP cash 
assistance on women empowerment indicators whereas positive value of β3 indicate the positive impact 
of BISP cash assistance over time. 
 
3.5 Measures of Empowerment Indicators 
Women empowerment have measured by devising various dimensions and indicators. The indicators 
pertinent to dimension of gender norms have been categorized into binary variables. The positive outcome 
is coded as ‘1’ whereas negative outcome coded as ‘0’. To measure the women empowerment from men’s 
perspective, the estimations has also been made from men’s perspective. The second dimension 
encompasses indicators pertinent to women autonomy/mobility to various places such as move alone to 
visit market, friend’s home, health center and religious center. Women index is also generated by 
summing up all possible positive outcomes. The third dimension contains outcome indicators pertinent to 
socio-economic and political empowerment. The dimension of socio-economic and political 
empowerment includes indicators of women voting decision in election, women decision power of her 
own earned income, decision of having an another child, minor purchases decision, small investment 
decision, child education decision, participation in groups outside were included in this dimension. The 
outcome indicators and data source detail is illustrated in Table 1 (Appendix-II)  
 
4. Results and Discussions 
In this section socio-demographic and economic profiles of the households have been discussed based on 
poverty score that segregate beneficiary households to non-beneficiary households at eligibility threshold. 
Furthermore, performances of women empowerment indicators are also computed around the eligibility 
threshold. Finally the RD and DiD results are discussed on various dimensions of women empowerment 
in separate sections.  
 
4.1 Socio-Demographic and Economic Profile of the Households 
The socio-demographic and economic profiles of the households contain information pertinent to 
household size, number of male and female adults, education of the head, employment status etc. The 
household size lies between 7 to 8 members in all rounds indicating no significant change. Numbers of 
female and male adults has increased from 1.9 to 2.2 and 1.8 to 2.1, respectively from 2011 to 2016. The 
average age has increased from 46 years to 48 for the same period. The female headed households have 
increased from 6.6% to 11.1% overtime. The education of households head has also increased from 2.1 
years to 2.4 years. The high dependency ratio shows decreasing trend in 2016. The alarming issue is that 
employment level of households heads has significantly decreased across time from 81.6 percent to 75.2 
percent. This may be due to using same households for all rounds so many heads may have reached at 
retirement age during this period. The socio-demographic and economic profiles of the households show 
that all households’ lying within +/-5 bandwidths of poverty score on average are similar in characteristics 
and cane be comparable.  
 
Table 2: Socio-Demographic & Economic Status of Households (Within +/- 5 Bandwidth) 
 
Characteristics 
Round 2011 Round 2016 
11.17 to 
16.17 
16.18 to 
21.17 
11.17 to 
16.17 
16.18 to 21.17 
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Household size (average) 7.6 7.9 7.7 7.2 
No. of male adults in households (15-64) 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.0 
No. of female adults in households (15-64) 1.9 1.9 2.2 2.1 
Age of the head (Average) 46.3 44.9 47.9 48.3 
Female head of the household (%) 6.6 8.4 11.1 13.8 
Presence of disables (%) 32.8 31.5 22.7 22.2 
*High dependency ratio (%) 56.8 48.6 37.7 34.1 
Head education (No of years) 2.1 2.4 2.4 2.9 
Head employed (%) 81.6 76.4 75.2 72.1 
N 1356 1135 3536 4008 
*Dependency ratio is number of dependent members (below 15 or above 64) divided by number of independent. 
Low dependency means if ratio is 0-0.05, medium dependency mean 0.51-1 and high dependency means >1 
Source: Estimated from the BISP Impact Evaluation Survey 2011 - 2016 by authors 
 
4.2 Women Empowerment Indicators Performance  
The women empowerment indicators performance in each round has been estimated by taking averages of 
all outcome variables across all households. Table 3 & 4 demonstrate averages of all outcome indicators 
under each dimension.  
 
Table 3: Women Empowerment Indicators Performance within +/- 5 Bandwidth (Average) 
Welfare Indicators Baseline 2011 Round 2016 
 
11.17 to 16.17 
16.18 to 
21.17 
11.17 to 
16.17 
16.18 to 21.17 
Women Participation in Voting    
Punjab 62.0 69.6 91.4 86.7 
Sindh 77.3 75.9 90.9 80.4 
KP 33.7 39.6 68.9 61.6 
*Balochistan 81.5 77.7 89.4 85.7 
Gender Norms (Female Response)   
Disagreed that family decision should be taken by 
men 
14.7 20.0 20.4 20.1 
Agreed if wife is working outside, husband should 
help in chores 
73.8 74.3 72.9 73.7 
Agreed  if married women allows to works outside 
if she likes 
74.7 76.3 76.4 77.3 
Agreed to express her opinion 82.5 82.9 88.1 86.9 
Disagreed  if being beaten by her husband 17.8 19.3 10.0 10.0 
Disagreed to send son to school than daughter 80.6 81.9 67.9 69.1 
Gender Norms (Male Response)   
Disagreed that family decision should be taken by 
men 
18.5 18.9 21.6 25.6 
Agreed if wife is working outside, husband should 
help in chores 
71.5 71.9 74.3 76.2 
Agreed  if married women allows to works outside 
if she likes 
50.5 50.4 49.1 49.8 
Agreed to express her opinion 70.4 71.7 84.5 84.4 
Disagreed  if being beaten by her husband 27.4 23.4 16.1 17.1 
Disagreed to send son to school than daughter 70.0 72.9 73.9 77.5 
Source: Estimated from the BISP Impact Evaluation Survey 2011 - 2016 by authors. Note: The averages of 
baseline and 2016 round are based on cross-sectional household’s lies within +/- 5 bandwidth. 
 
The averages of outcome indicators across time show positive or flat trend in many variables except in 
few indicators of gender norms. The describing opinion that disagree that “wife should tolerate being 
beaten by her husband” shows increasing trend across time in female response while opposite response 
have received from male. The averages across time pertinent to gender norms show variation as majority 
of the men are of the view that women should work outside if she likes and having right to express 
opinion but on other side  many of them did not allow women to involve in minor family decisions. The 
averages of women mobility shows increasing trend across time demonstrate women mobility improved 
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over time in each round. Women mobility to friends’ home, visit to market and health center was 56.6, 
40.9 and 40 percentage in 2016.  
Table 4: Women Empowerment Indicators Performance within +/- 5 Bandwidth (Average) 
Welfare Indicators Baseline 2011 Round 2016 
11.17 to 
16.17 
16.18 to 21.17 
11.17 to 
16.17 
16.18 to 
21.17 
                                              Women Autonomy/Mobility   
Visit to market 30.1 36.2 40.9 39.4 
Visit to Health center 32.7 38.8 40.0 38.7 
Visit to Friend’s house 42.9 49.4 56.6 54.5 
Visit to Religious center 28.5 33.3 29.0 27.4 
                                                 Socio-Economic & Political Empowerment   
Decision of spending of her own earned 
income 
86.8 90.2 95.0 94.7 
Have another Child 35.9 35.3 40.7 41.2 
Children’s education decision 39.4 39.3 58.3 54.2 
Minor households purchases decision 34.7 34.2 37.8 37.2 
Small investment decision 38.3 37.7 39.1 35.7 
Participation in groups outside the home 33.0 32.6 29.6 28.6 
Vote in election 33.8 33.7 44.5 40.3 
Source: Estimated from the BISP Impact Evaluation Survey 2011 - 2016 by authors. Note: The averages of 
baseline and 2016 round are based on cross-sectional sample households lies within +/-5 bandwidth. 
 
The outcome indicators pertinent to socio-economic and political empowerment depict increasing trend as 
compared to non-beneficiary women in during 2011-2016 except participation in groups outside which 
show decreasing trend across time.  
 
4.3 RDD Impact Estimates on Women Empowerment 
The results of the study discussed RDD estimate pertinent to women empowerment for 2016 cross-
sectional households. Table 5 indicate RDD estimate on gender norms with women perspective show that 
all indicators of gender norms except the category “Disagreed that family decision by men” are 
statistically insignificant. The variable “Disagreed that family decision by men” is statistically significant 
at +/-3 bandwidth at 4 percent level whereas it is also statistically significant at optimal bandwidth at 3 
percent level. There is no other impact of RDD on other individual indicators pertinent to women 
perspective during 2016 but the coefficient depicted positive values. The sum of all gender norms 
indicators with women perspective also indicate insignificant impact of the pogramme on gender norms. 
Table 5: RDD Impact Estimates on Gender Norms at various Bandwidth: Female Response 
RDD Estimates for 2016  Sample 
2016  Sample Disagree 
that 
family 
decision 
by men 
Agreed 
male 
should 
help 
Agree that 
women 
should 
work 
Agree that 
female 
have right 
to express 
opinion 
Disagree 
that wife 
should 
tolerate 
being 
beaten 
Disagree 
that better 
to send son  
Sum of 
the 
gender 
norms 
measures 
+/-5 PMT Score Bandwidth 
RD Estimates 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.004 0.003 -0.01 0.003 
Standard Error (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
P-value 0.32 0.55 0.54 0.83 0.82 0.59 0.88 
Sample size left of 
the cut-off 
3536 2946 2932 2899 3536 3536 3536 
Sample size right of 
the cut-off 
4008 3293 3271 3269 4008 4008 4008 
+/-3 PMT Score Bandwidth 
RD Estimates 0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.008 0.009 -0.02 0.001 
Standard Error (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
P-value 0.04** 0.67 0.29 0.71 0.59 0.55 0.96 
Sample size left of 2406 2011 2001 1971 2406 2406 2406 
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the cut-off 
Sample size right of 
the cut-off 
2382 1969 1953 1950 2382 2382 2382 
Optimal Bandwidth   
RD Estimates 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.009 0.01 -0.03 -0.001 
Standard Error 0.02 (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
P-value 0.03** 0.35 0.40 0.73 0.54 0.40 0.96 
Sample size left of 
the cut-off 
2194 2154 2624 2906 3561 3208 2510 
Sample size right of 
the cut-off 
1378 762 1115 764 1133 1105 1246 
* shows significance at 1 percent, ** shows significance at 5%, *** shows significance at 10%. Fuzzy RD 
estimates are used and the p-value is associated with the robust local polynomial that is bias-corrected, whilst the 
estimates are based on the kernel triangular method.  Note: The BISP poverty score was normalized so that 
eligibility threshold = 0, Source: Estimated from the BISP Impact Evaluation Survey, 2016 round 
 
The analysis of gender norms with men’s perspective as shown in Table 6 show no impact of the 
programme on gender norms with men’s perspective. The individual coefficients of gender norms all are 
negative. Conceivably, the cash assistance programme could not be helpful to change men’s attitude 
towards women in the long run. The sum of the gender norms with men’s perspective is also shown 
insignificant impact in 2016.   The prevailing social and custom norms and low women status in Pakistan 
does not allow women to stand along with men.  
 
Table 6: RDD Impact Estimates on Gender Norms at various Bandwidth: Male Response 
RDD Estimates for 2016  Sample 
2016  Sample Disagree 
that 
family 
decision 
by men 
Agreed 
male 
should 
help 
Agree that 
women 
should 
work 
Agree that 
female 
have right 
to express 
opinion 
Disagree 
that wife 
should 
tolerate 
being 
beaten 
Disagree 
that 
better to 
send son  
Sum of 
the 
gender 
norms 
measures 
+/-5 PMT Score Bandwidth 
RD Estimates -0.04 0.005 -0.008 0.01 -0.03 -0.07 0.02 
Standard Error (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
P-value 0.16 0.84 0.80 0.52 0.23 0.01* 0.48 
Sample size left of the 
cut-off 
2528 2510 2505 2512 2466 2488 3536 
Sample size right of the 
cut-off 
2772 2741 2722 2737 2694 2729 4008 
+/-3 PMT Score Bandwidth  
RD Estimates -0.05 -0.006 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.01 
Standard Error (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
P-value 0.22 0.86 0.59 0.43 0.25 0.02* 0.65 
Sample size left of the 
cut-off 
1727 1718 1713 1713 1689 1701 2406 
Sample size right of the 
cut-off 
1644 1627 1608 1625 1599 1616 2382 
Optimal Bandwidth  
RD Estimates -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.06 -0.08 0.03 
Standard Error (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
P-value 0.27 0.68 0.38 0.41 0.16 0.03** 0.33 
Sample size left of the 
cut-off 
1686 1737 1901 1459 1892 1860 2362 
Sample size right of the 
cut-off 
1138 942 798 1114 617 1015 1603 
* shows significance at 1 percent, ** shows significance at 5%, *** shows significance at 10%. Fuzzy RD 
estimates are used and the p-value is associated with the robust local polynomial that is bias-corrected, whilst the 
estimates are based on the kernel triangular method.  Note: The BISP poverty score was normalized so that 
eligibility threshold = 0, Source: Estimated from the BISP Impact Evaluation Survey, 2016 round 
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The RDD results for 2016 round regarding all four mobility indicators show positive and significant on 
beneficiary households than non-beneficiary households. The estimates pertinent to women mobility to 
visit markets coefficients are positive in fixed and optimal bandwidth. The women mobility to market 
increased by 7 percent at +/-5 and +/-3 bandwidth and by 10 percent at optimal bandwidth depicted in 
Table 7. The women mobility to health center increased by 5 percent at +/-5 followed by 6 percent at +/-3 
bandwidth and by 15 percent at optimal bandwidth. By looking into estimates of optimal bandwidth, the 
coefficients of all four measures of women mobility show positive and significant impact of the 
programme. At optimal bandwidth. Women mobility to friend’s home and religious center is positive and 
statistical significant at optimal bandwidth. Women mobility to friend’s home improved by 13 percent 
followed by women mobility to religious center by 8 percent and sum of all mobility measures by 8 
percent. The visual evidence of the sum of mobility measures is depicted in Fig 1 (Appendix-I). 
 
Table 7: RDD Impact Estimates on Women Autonomy/Mobility at various Bandwidth  
RDD Estimates for 2016  Sample 
2016  Sample Free mobility to 
market 
Health center Friend’s 
home 
Religious 
center 
Sum of the 
four 
mobility 
measures 
+/-5 PMT Score Bandwidth 
RD Estimates 0.07 0.05*** 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Standard Error (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
P-value 0.01* 0.08 0.43 0.20 0.27 
Sample size left of the cut-off 3104 3105 3106 3068 3687 
Sample size right of the cut-
off 
3455 3457 3454 3410 4175 
+/-3 PMT Score Bandwidth 
RD Estimates 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.03 
Standard Error (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
P-value 0.04** 0.09*** 0.55 0.14 0.41 
Sample size left of the cut-off 2105 2106 2107 2082 2504 
Sample size right of the cut-
off 
2064 2066 2064 2036 2490 
Optimal Bandwidth 
RD Estimates 0.10 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.08 
Standard Error (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 0.03 (0.04) 
P-value 0.02* 0.001* 0.01* 0.03** 0.08*** 
Sample size left of the cut-off 2309 2523 2429 3068 2748 
Sample size right of the cut-
off 
820 587 561 774 848 
* shows significance at 1 percent, ** shows significance at 5%, *** shows significance at 10%. Fuzzy RD 
estimates are used and the p-value is associated with the robust local polynomial that is bias-corrected, whilst the 
estimates are based on the kernel triangular method.  Note: The BISP poverty score was normalized so that 
eligibility threshold = 0, Source: Estimated from the BISP Impact Evaluation Survey, 2016 round 
 
 
The third dimension contains RDD estimates pertaining to women socio-economic and political (SEP) 
empowerment which includes women decision making and voting power in election. The results are 
illustrated in Table 8. The RDD estimate show improvement in children’s education decision by 4 
percent at +/-5 bandwidth. The women in 2016 were able to take decisions about their child education 
which is good and positive sign of improvement. Women political participation indicate that women 
voting in election have been improved by 9 percent at +/-5 & +/-3 bandwidth and by 13 percent at optimal 
bandwidth as compared to non-beneficiary women households. The sum of socio-economic and political 
empowerment show improvement by 5 percent at +/-5 bandwidth followed by 5 percent at +/-3 bandwidth 
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and by 8 percent at optimal bandwidth.  The visual evidence is illustrated in Fig 2, 3 & Fig 4 (Appendix-
I). 
 
Table 8: RDD Impact Estimates on Socio-Economic & Political Empowerment (SEP) at various Bandwidth  
RDD Estimates for 2016 Sample 
2016  
Sample 
Spending 
decision 
of her 
own 
earned 
income 
Have 
another 
Child 
Children’s 
education 
decision 
Minor 
households 
purchases 
decision 
Small 
investment 
decision 
Participation 
in groups 
outside the 
home 
Vote in 
election 
Sum of 
the SEP 
indicators 
measures 
+/-5 PMT Score Bandwidth 
RD 
Estimates 
-0.006 0.01 0.04 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 0.09 0.06 
Standard 
Error 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
P-value 0.76 0.66 0.08*** 0.78 0.91 0.94 0.00* 0.003* 
Sample 
size left of 
the cut-off 
847 3536 3536 3536 3536 3536 3636 3536 
Sample 
size right 
of the cut-
off 
833 4008 4008 4008 4008 4008 4083 4008 
+/-3 PMT Score Bandwidth 
RD 
Estimates 
-0.03 -0.006 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.003 0.09 0.05 
Standard 
Error 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
P-value 0.16 0.84 0.17 0.65 0.41 0.90 0.00* 0.05** 
Sample 
size left of 
the cut-off 
569 2406 2406 2406 2406 2406 2463 2406 
Sample 
size right 
of the cut-
off 
500 2382 2382 2382 2382 2382 2435 2382 
Optimal Bandwidth 
RD 
Estimates 
-0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.004 -0.03 -0.0003 0.13 0.05 
Standard 
Error 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
P-value 0.008 0.76 0.17 0.91 0.41 0.99 0.01* 0.08** 
Sample 
size left of 
the cut-off 
768 2507 3263 1865 2356 2508 3291 1839 
Sample 
size right 
of the cut-
off 
155 1634 1102 1095 1602 1054 835 1454 
* shows significance at 1 percent, ** shows significance at 5%, *** shows significance at 10%. Fuzzy RD 
estimates are used and the p-value is associated with the robust local polynomial that is bias-corrected, whilst the 
estimates are based on the kernel triangular method.  Note: The BISP poverty score was normalized so that 
eligibility threshold = 0, Source: Estimated from the BISP Impact Evaluation Survey, 2016 round 
  
5. Difference in Difference Model Results 
The welfare impact of BISP cash assistance programme has computed by using DiD model approach on 
BISP panel households from 2011 to 2016 rounds. The results of DiD model on various indicators of 
women empowerment is reported in Table 9 & 10. The DiD estimate on gender norms with women 
perspective indicate that majority of the coefficients are positive but insignificant except the category 
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‘Disagree that family decision by men’ which show that 6 percent of the women beneficiary disagreed 
with the statement of family decision by men. The DiD estimate pertinent to gender norms with men 
perspectives how no improvement in men’s attitude towards women over time. 
 
Table 9: DiD Impact on Welfare Indicators 
 
Welfare Indicators 
Control Treatment  
Difference-in-
difference Coef 
(SE) 
Baseline Mean 
(SE) 
Difference 
Coef 
(SE) 
Baseline Mean 
(SE) 
Difference 
Coef 
(SE) 
Gender Norms (Female Response) 
Disagree that family 
decision by men 
0.20 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.12 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
Agreed male should help 
in households chores 
0.75 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.72 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
Agree that women should 
work 
0.77 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.73 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Agree that female have 
right to express opinion 
0.83 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
0.80 
(0.01) 
0.08*** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
Disagree that wife should 
tolerate being beaten 
0.18 
(0.01) 
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
0.19 
(0.01) 
-0.10*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
Disagree that better to send 
son 
0.81 
(0.01) 
-0.14*** 
(0.02) 
0.76 
(0.01) 
-0.10*** 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Gender Norms (Male Response) 
Disagree that family 
decision by men 
0.19 
(0.02) 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
0.17 
(0.01) 
0.06** 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
Agreed male should help 
in households chores 
0.73 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.72 
(0.01) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Agree that women should 
work 
0.52 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.49 
(0.01) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
Agree that female have 
right to express opinion 
0.72 
(0.02) 
0.13*** 
(0.02) 
0.69 
(0.01) 
0.15*** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
Disagree that wife should 
tolerate being beaten 
0.36 
(0.02) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.27 
(0.01) 
-0.12*** 
(0.01) 
-0.05* 
(0.03) 
Disagree that better to send 
son 
0.73 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.67 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
Asterisks (*) indicate that DiD estimate is statistically significant: *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10, 
Source: Estimated from BISP Impact Evaluation Panel Survey 2011 & 2016 by authors 
 
The results about women participation in voting shows positive and significant impact by 9 
percentage points. Women participation in voting show that more percentage of beneficiaries women due 
to having valid CNIC are now participating in election for voting than those of non-beneficiary women 
over time.  The statistics of women participation in taking small investment decision shows positive and 
significant increase by 7 percentage points as compared to non-beneficiary women over time whereas, 
decision about children’s education have improved by 5 percentage points in the same period that shows 
the amount of cash grant provision only to women improve her decision power to spend money on child 
education. The results about women mobility shows positive and highly significant impact of the 
programme as its shows increase women mobility to market by 4 percentage points followed by women 
mobility to friend’s home by 10 percentage points and increase in women mobility to religious center by 7 
percentage points and women mobility to health center by 6 percentage points over time as compared to 
non-beneficiary households. The sum of all four mobility measures indicate improvement by 11 
percentage points over time.  
 
Table 10: DiD Impact on Welfare Indicators 
  
Welfare Indicators 
Control Treatment  
Difference-in-
difference Coef 
(SE) 
Baseline Mean 
(SE) 
Difference 
Coef 
(SE) 
Baseline Mean 
(SE) 
Difference 
Coef 
(SE) 
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Socio-economic & Political Empowerment 
Voting in election 0.64 
(0.02) 
  0.17*** 
(0.02) 
0.62 
(0.01) 
  0.26*** 
(0.01) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
Decision power on her 
own earned spending 
0.21 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.22 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Decision of having another 
child 
0.36 
(0.02) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.36 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Minor purchases decision 0.35 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.38 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
Small investment decision 0.39 
(0.02) 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
0.40 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.07** 
(0.03) 
Child education decision 0.14 
(0.02) 
0.16*** 
(0.02) 
0.41 
(0.01) 
0.21*** 
(0.01) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
Participation in group 
outside 
0.33 
(0.02) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.34 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Women Autonomy/Mobility 
Free mobility to market 0.36 
(0.02) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.27 
(0.01) 
0.09*** 
(0.01) 
0.04* 
(0.03) 
Free mobility to friend’s 
home 
0.50 
(0.02) 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
0.40 
(0.01) 
0.17*** 
(0.01) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
Free mobility to religious 
center 
0.33 
(0.02) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.25 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.03) 
Free mobility to health 
center 
0.39 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.30 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.01) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
Sum of mobility measures 0.48 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.38 
(0.01) 
0.14*** 
(0.01) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
Asterisks (*) indicate that DiD estimate is statistically significant: *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10, 
Source: Estimated from BISP Impact Evaluation Panel Survey 2011 & 2016 by authors 
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The study evaluated the impact of BISP unconditional cash transfer programme on BISP beneficiary 
household women by using Fuzzy RDD model approach on cross-sectional households, 2016 and DiD 
model on panel housheolds 20112016. The women empowerment have been quantified through 
dimensions centered on gender norms, women autonomy/mobility and socio-economic and political 
empowerment of women. The results of RDD estimate observed that BISP had positive and significant 
impact on women socio-economic and political empowerment and women mobility in 2016 whilst the 
study has observed no significant impact in improving gender norms with men’s perspective.  The DiD 
model indicate positive and significant improvement in socio-economic and political empowerment and 
women mobility over time whilst the DiD model has not observed any significant improvement in gender 
norms with men’s perspective overtime. This shows that in developing countries like Pakistan, women are 
not as much stronger with men’s perspective due to prevailing customs and norms. The men belonging to 
extreme poor class are used to beating, humiliating and insulting women due to less education and 
conservative attitude that may take time to change. In the prevailing situation in Pakistan, women status in 
perceived very low as compared to other countries whereas women empowerment is linked with 
economic growth of the country (Duflo, 2011). The increase in women empowerment measures 
ultimately leads to improve economy of Pakistan in future. Empowering women through various safety 
net initiatives may lead to reduce intergenerational transmission of poverty as the women who received 
cash assistance are more willing to spend on her child education and health. The provision of cash 
assistance to women may likely to improve child nutrition in return and reduce child labor as well that 
exert impact on reducing poverty in future. Increase in amount of cash transfer suggestive subject to 
conditions will also improve the socio-economic stability of the beneficiary household’s women in long 
run.  
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Appendix- I 
Figure 1: Mobility Index    Figure 2: Voting in Election  
           
Source: Estimated from the BISP Impact Evaluation Survey 2016 by authors. Fig 1 depict discontinuity in sum mobility 
measures (index) and  Fig 2 show discontinuity in voting in election with normed poverty score limited to +/-5. 
Fig 3:  Child Education Decision      Fig 4: SEP-Empowerment Index 
   
Source: Estimated from the BISP Impact Evaluation Survey 2016 by authors. Fig 3 depict discontinuity in child education 
decision and Fig 4 show discontinuity in sum of SEP-empowerment indicators (index) with normed poverty score limited to +/-
5 bandwidth..  
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Appendix-II 
Table 1: Women Empowerment Indicators and Data Source 
Woman Empowerment Indicators Data Source 
Gender Perspective Men’s Questionnaire & Women’s Form, The variable is 
constructed by combining agree/strongly agree or 
disagree/strongly disagree options by using 2011 and 
2016 round. The positive outcome is coded as ‘1’ 
whereas negative outcome is coded as ‘0’.  
Disagreed that family decision should be taken by 
men 
Agreed if wife is working outside, husband should 
help in chores 
Agreed  if married women allows to works outside if 
she likes 
Agreed to express her opinion 
Disagreed  if being beaten by her husband 
Disagreed to send son to school than daughter 
Women Autonomy/Mobility The variables constructed by using Women’s form only 
for 2011 and 2016 rounds. The variable constructed 
based on women mobility to various places where 
mobility alone is coded as ‘1’  and mobility with 
someone and no mobility is coded as ‘0’. 
Freely visit to market 
Health center 
Friend’s house 
Religious center 
Socio-economic and political empowerment The variables constructed by using Women’s form only 
for 2011 and 2016 rounds only. The positive outcome is 
coded as ‘1’ whereas the negative outcome is coded as 
‘0’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision of spending of her own earned income 
Have another Child 
Children’s education decision 
Minor households purchases decision 
Small investment decision 
Participation in groups outside the home 
Vote in election 
 
 
